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This study is a critical policy analysis of some of the policy issues facing the
Department of Transport, and some of the implementation challenges
experienced.
The policy analysis concludes that one cannot assess whether or not the
Department of Transport's policies: and .programmes are successfully
implemented, because they have not considered or designed measures of
evaluation or impact of any of their policies.
Some of the policy issues and problems facing the Department of Transport still
exist despite the various policy proposals, strategies or programs which they




This study is consists of three sections. The first section being a theoretical
perspective on the public policy theory. This section includes the policy concepts
of policy implementation, policy analysis and evaluation.
The second section of this research is the identification of the policy issue. It is a
theoretical analysis of the literature available on the policy issue. This research
uses qualitative research methodology. The data was collected through methods
such as participant observation, in-depth interviewing and document analysis.
The research findings were based on a document analysis.
In this part of my research I identified some of the policy issues faced by the
National Department of Transport and their responses to these particular policy
issues. I then examined this according to the Departments policy framework
which they have designed and implemented in response to those policy issues.
This part offers some critical policy analysis of some of the Department's of
Transport policy programmes.
The third section of my research.is a review of the theoretical perspective
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The complexity of public policy is such that in many instances authors have not
been able to agree on one specific definition. Some of the most common
definitions are explained from the various authors. Anderson states that 'a policy
usually involves a series of more specific decisions, sometimes in a rational
sequence. Even when the sequence is more erratic, a policy is typically
generated by interactions among ,many, more or less consciously related
'., .
decisions' (Anderson, 1984: 5).Coning (2000:3) argues that policy is defined as a
statement of intent. Policy specifies goals. Policy interprets the values of society
and is usually embodied in the management of pertinent projects and
programmes. Policy, he argues, is, larger than a decision.
1.2 Public Policy is differentiated from Policy
For policy to be regarded as a "public policy" it must to some degree have been
generated or at least processed within the framework of governmel"Jtal
procedures, influences and organizations (Hogwood and Gunn (cited in Coning,
2000: 12)). Dunn (cited in van Niekerk and Jonker, 2001: 87) defines public
policy as "a long series of more or less related choices, inclUding decisions not to
act, made by governmental bodies and officials". Colebatch (2002: 9) argues that
policy is first of all concerned with order. Secondly, policy rests on authority, and
thirdly, policy implies expertise. Public Policy is a central concept in both the
analysis a'nd the practice of the way we are governed. It gives both observers
and participants a handle on the process, a way of making sense of the
complexity of governing (Colebatch, 2002: 1). Hogwood and Gunn (cited in
Coning, 2000: 12) argue that public policy is a series of patterns of related
discussions to which many circumstances and personal, group and
organizational influences have contributed. Policy requires an understanding of
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behaviour, especially behaviour involving interaction within and among
organizational relationships.
Dye (1992: xiii) states that policy analysis is concerned with "who gets what" in
politics and, more importantly, "why" and "what difference it makes." We are
concerned not only with what policies governments pursue but also why
governments pursue the policies they do, and what the consequences of these
policies are. In addition, Dye (1992: 4) states that public policy can be studied for
purely scientific reasons: understand~ngthe causes and consequences of policy
decisions improves our knowledge of society. He continues to state that policy
analysis encourages scholars and students to attack critical policy issues with the
tools of systematic inquiry. There is an implied assumption in policy analysis that
developing scientific knowledge about the forces shaping public policy and the
consequences of public policy is itself a socially relevant activity, and that such
analysis is a prerequisite to prescription, advocacy, and activism (Dyer; 1992:
7).lt is questionable that policy analysis can ever provide "solutions" to problems.
First of all, it is easy to exaggerate the importance, both for good and for ill, of the
polices of governments.
Cloete and Gladden (cited in Coning, 2000: 15) argue that public policy can be
examined on the basis of levels; for example political, executive and
administrative. Types of public policy are also often seen in terms of 3 main
categories of players on the policy scene: civil policy (emanating predominantly
from NGO's and civil society), private se~tor policy, political policy refers to policy
of political parties.
In addition, Colebatch (2002: 23) states that there are two dimensions to policy
(represented by Figure: 1), the 'vertical' and 'horizontal', and this has a big
impact on the way we make sense of policy. The vertical dimension sees policy
as rule: it is concerned with the transmission downward of authorized decisions.
2
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The authorized decision-makers select courses of action which will maximize the
values they hold, and transmit these to subordinate officials. The horizontal
dimension sees policy in terms of the structuring of action. It is concerned with
relationships among policy participants in different organizations that is, outside
of the line of hierarchical authority. It recognizes that policy work takes place
across organizational boundaries as well as within them, and consists in the
structure of understandings and commitments among participants in different
organizations as well as the hierarchical transmission of authorized decisions
within anyone organization. It is concerned with the nature of these linkages
across organizations, with how they are formed and sustained. The two
dimensions are not alternatives: rather, tends to overlap. The implementation of
the authorized decision calls for the cooperation of relevant others outside the




(Source: Colebatch, 2002: 23)
The definition by Turner and Hulme (1997: 198) succinctly takes into account the
various definitions already presented. They summarize public policy as ' a highly
complex matter, consisting of a series of decisions, involving a large number of
actors operating within the confines of an amorphous, yet inescapable,
institutional set-up, and employing a variety of instruments. One of the simplest
and most effective ways to deal with this complexity has been to break down the
public policy-making process into series of discrete' but related sub-processes
(stages), together forming a continuing cycle'.
We now turn our attention to the policy cycle and it is worth noting that the stages.
in the policy cycle (represented by Figure: 2) corresponds to the six stages in
4
applied problem-solving, whereby problems are recognized, solutions are
proposed, a solution chosen, the chosen solution is put onto effect and finally the
outcomes ar~ monitor~d" a'~d' :eval~ated. In the policy cycle, these stages are·
manifested as (1) problem identification, (2) agenda -setting, (3) policy
formulation, (4) decision-making, (5) policy implementation, and (6) policy
evaluation. The policy making cycle has been broken down into stages for
analytical purposes.
Figure: 2 A Policy Cycle Model:






1.3 Problem/Issue Recognition Stage
According to Fox and Meyer (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 99) in problem
definition, causal linkages must be estC1blished between policy issues that cause
problems detrimental to certain causes and stakeholders. These issues need to
be addressed through deliberate public policy interventions at the appropriate
level by the most appropriate policy agent. This is a typical systems model
perspective, which assumes linear causal relationships between policy causes
and effects (ibid). A second important aspect of problem definition is the way the
problem has been structured (a~ aneed,an opportunity; a challenge or a threat).. .' .
Each problem structuring approach has its own influence on the contents and
processes of policy programmes designed to solve such a problem (ibid).
Meyer and Cloete (2000: 97) state that the policy process normally starts when a
policy issue or problem is identified by one or more stakeholders in society, who
feel that the actions of the government detrimentally affect. them or other
segments of society. They then mobilize support to persuade policy-makers to do
something in order to change the status quo in their favour. Fox and Meyer (cited
in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 98) argue that policy issues are conflicts' or
disagreements about the nature and origin of policy problems and consequently
imply a difference in the approach to problem solving. Policy problems, on the
other hand, are those needs and non-use of opportunities that may have a
detrimental effect on at least one segment of society and may be constructively
addressed through public action.
Furthermore, for some social problems it is useful to refer to existing "social
indicators" in order to examine historical trends. A social indicator is a continuous
measure of the extent of a social phenomenon (Rossi and Freeman, 1989: 80).
Rossi and Freeman (1989: 80) state that social indicators can provide important
information for policy planning purposes in several ways. First, trends shown can
be used to alert the society to whether certain social conditions are improving,
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remaining the same, or deteriorating. Second, when properly analysed, the data
can be used to estimate the size and distribution of the social problems whose
course is being tracked over time. Finally, the social indicator trends can be used
to provide a first estimate of the effects of social programs that have been in
place. To make an item from a less visible area move up on a governmental
agenda, something must happen, and that something often is a real crisis- the
sort of thing government decision makers cannot ignore. Often conditions must
deteriorate to crisis proportions before the subject achieves enough visibility to
become an active agenda item (Kingdon, 1989: 95).
In addition to indicators governmental officials receive feedback about the
operation of existing programs. They monitor expenditures, have experience with
administering programs, evaluate and oversee implementation, and receive
complaints. This feedback often brings problems to their attention: programs that,
are not working as planned, implementation that does not square with their
interpretation of the legislative mandate, new problems that have arisen as a
result of a programs enactment, or unanticipated consequences that must be
remedied (Kingdon, 1989: 101).
In addition Hogwood and Gunn (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 99) identify the
different methods in which governments prioritize policy issues and problems.
These are; undirected viewing which involves collecting information with no
specific purpose in mind. Governments use this method to maintain an up-to-
date picture of the political, economic, social and technological currents in
society. Conditional viewing which involves a degree of purpose in searching for
or collecting information. Here, the focus is to see how information can either
reinforce or reject claims for priority treatment of policy problems. Officials may
visit other departments or regions for a specific purpose and use such case
studies to motivate or legitimize policy claims. Informal Search I; this method the
government seeks information more actively. Public managers may be requested
7
.~_.
to collect certain types of information. Formal Search; this method involves
gathering specific information for specific purposes. Formal searches take the
form of research assignments, departmental investigations, and commissions of
enquiry or task teams (ibid)
Furthermore, according to Kingdon (1989: 114) conditions become defined as
problems when we come to believe that we should do something about them.
Sometimes, the mere recognition of a pressing problem is sufficient to gain a
subject a prominent place on the policy agenda.. Simple interest group pressures
or other expressions of preferences may gain issue prominence, independent of
a problem being solved. People in and around government sense a national
mood. They are discussing its content, and believe that they know when the
mood shifts. But common to all of these labels is the notion that a rather large
number of people within civil society are thinking along certain common lines.
This is referred to as the national mood, and that this national mood changes
from one time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood
have important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes (Kingdon, 1989:
146).
In essence Kingdon (1989: 146) argues that in contrast to this ability of the
national mood to promote some policy issues onto a higher agenda status,
policy-makers' perception of the national mood also serves as a constraint,
pushing other items into relative obscurity. When it involves governmental actors,
Kingdon (1989: 153) argues that agenda change occurs in one of two ways.
Either incumbents in position of authority change their priorities and push new
agenda items; or the personnel in those position changes, bringing new priorities
onto the agenda by virtue of the turnover (Kingon, 1989: 154). This stage is
closely linked to the agenda setting stage whereby problems that require most
attention are considered. In many regards the problem identification and agenda-
setting stage have many links that often diffuse these two stages.
8
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1.4 Agenda- Setting Stage
This preliminary process to change public policy is normally termed "policy
agenda-setting".' Policy 'agenda-setting is, therefore, in a wider sense, a
deliberate process of planning and action which defines and prioritises policy
issues and problems, mobilizes support and lobbies decision-makers to take
appropriate action (Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 98). An argument by Hogwood and
Gunn (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 99) is that policy agenda-setting is
necessary because of the deluge of policy-related issues and problems that any
government faces, normally with insufficient resources to address these
problems effectively. Public policies develop out of a given socio-political context.
Agenda-setting emanates from the same context and is therefore intrinsically
linked to the nature of the political landscape. In open and democratic societies
the notion of open and equal access to the agenda stage is advocated. In closed
and authoritarian states the power to influence the policy agenda is largely, if not
exclusively, in the hands of the party bosses or the head of state (ibid).
Kingdon (1989: 90) argues that problems come to the attention of governmental
decision-makers not only through S9me sort of political pressure or perceptual
slight of hand but because some more or less systematic indicator simply shows
that there is a problem out there. Such indicators abound in the political world
because both governmental and non-governmental agencies routinely monitor
various activities and events: such as highway deaths, disease rates and many
others (Kingdon, 1989: 90). Decision-makers and those close to them use such
indicators, in two major ways: to assess the magnitude of a problem and to
become aware of changes in the problem. Constructing an indicator and getting
others to agree to its worth become major preoccupations of those pressing for
policy change. The indicator itself is very powerful (Kingdon, 1989: 94).
Kingdon (1989: 3) states that the agenda is the list of subjects or problems to
which government officials, and ~ee,.le eutsi.e ef government closely associated
9
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with those officials, are paying som~ serious attention at any given time. Out of
the set of all policy issues or problems to which officials could be paying
attention, they do in fact seriously attend' t~ some rather than others. So the
agenda setting process narrows this set of conceivable subjects to the set that
actually becomes the focus of attention (Kingdon, 1989: 3). It is a crucial phase in
public policy making for two main reasons. Firstly, it determines who influences
or controls the policy-making process. Secondly, it determines how stakeholders
influence the policy agenda. Thus agenda-setting is both substantive and
procedural. An agenda is,rt0rr:na,l1yaHst of items to be dealt with during a
meeting. The agenda determi~es "th'e order in'which those items are discussed
(Meyer and Cloete, 2000:98). Furthermore, the exercise of power in this stage
becomes observable.
Central to Kingdon's argument around policy agendas is what he refers to as the
'policy window'. The pqlicy window, he argues, is an opportunity for advocates of
- --
proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special
problems. He claims that policy advocates lie in wait in and around government
with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can
attach their solutions, waiting for development in the political stream. The policy
window presents the opportunity for a launch (ibid). Windows open in policy
systems. These policy windows, or 'opportunities for action on given initiatives,
present themselves and stay open for only short periods (Kingdon, 1989: 169).
According to Kingdon (1989: 170) however the window,also closes for a variety
of reasons. First, participants may feel they have addressed the problem through
decision or enactment. Second, and closely related, participants may fail to get
action. If they fail, they are unwilling to invest further time, energy, political
capital, or other resources in the endeavor. Third, the events that promoted the
window to open may pass from the scene. Fourth, if a change in personnel
opens a window, a further change of personnel may change the policy window
again. People in key positions come and go, and so do opportunities that their
10
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presence furnishes. Finally, the window sometimes closes because there is no
suitable policy proposal or solution available.
Advocates of policy are also often referred to as policy experts or communities.
Kingdon (1989:-121) states that policy communities are composed of specialists
in a given policy area. They have in common their concern with one area of
policy problems. They also have in common their actions with each other. Some
communities are extremely closed and tightly knit. Other are more diverse and
fragmented, and as a. consequenCe . of. system fragmentation is policy
fragmentation. A closely knit· community generates common outlooks,
orientations, and ways of thinking. This common feature, a result of the relatively
tight integration of the community, in turn strengthens that integration.
Fragmentation begets instability. Hague and Harrop (2001: 157) present a
metaphor of a policy community that view the relationship between interest
groups and the state as warm and .snug. They imply that the actors involved in
". "
detailed policy-making in a particular· sec.tor form their own small village.
Everyone knows each other, uses given names and trust each other and respect
each others key objectives. Colebatch (2002: 35) adds that the most common
image of the policy collectivity has been that of community. This suggests
intimacy and trust: policy is made among people who know and trust one
another.
Jones (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 110) suggests that there are basically
three approaches to, or options for, agenda-setting. The first is the 'Let it happen
approach', which indicates that governments take a relatively passive role in
agenda-setting. Governments using this approach will allow access to the policy
machinery so that those who feel strongly about certain issues can be heard.
Although this might be an attractive option, Jones points to the fact that it simply
ignores the unequal distribution of power and forces in society. The second
approach is the 'Encourage it to happen approach' encourages governments to
11
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reach out to policy communities by assisting them in defining and articulating
their problems. The emphasis of this approach is to enable people to participate.
It does not facilitate problem identification by the people. Jones states that the
major problem with this approach to agenda-setting is that the government
decides unilaterally who needs, assistance, resulting in bias in favour of certain
groups. Nevertheless, this approach is proactive to the extent that the
government does engage with its citizens. Finally, the 'make it happen approach',
stresses Governments active role in defining problems and setting goals. This
approach advocates the notion that governments should define problems, set
priorities and establish goals, without waiting for public demands or needs to be
articulated. In terms of this approach governments systematically review public




(Source: Jansson; 2000: 111)
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Jones (cited in Meyers and Cloete, 2000: 109) states that one can distinguish
between two types of agenda-setting namely systemic and institutional. Systemic
agenda is a broader set ofi~syes facin~ society. Not all issues raised in systemic
agenda receive government attention. Issues raised in this way have a policy
community and involve matters falling within the scope of the governments
activities. The institutional agenda, on the other hand, is where problems receive
formal attention by the government. Jansson (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000:
111) presents us with the agenda funnel (illustrated by Figure: 2) as a way of
understanding the relationship between issues and agendas. He distinguishes
between general agendas and decision agendas. General agendas merely
collect policy problems and do nothing about them. Decision agendas, on the
other hand, are forwarded to a body for serious consideration (ibid). This is
closely linked to the decision-making stage. It is at the decision making stage that
policy makers get to choose from the alternatives that they have available.
1.5 Decision-Making Stage
In terms of the decision-making process Anderson (1984: 135) states that this
involves making a choice from among alternatives. A policy decision involves
action by some official person or body to adopt, modify, or reject a preferred
policy alternative. Furthermore, a policy decision is usually the culmination of
many decisions, some routine and some not so routine, made during the
operation of the policy process. Although in liberal democracy, final policy
decisions are made by the legislature.
Anderson (1984: 135) identifies three theories of decision-making that emphasize
the procedure and intellectual. activities involved in making a decision. These
include rational-comprehensive theory, the incremental theory and multiple
advocacies. The rational-comprehensive theory includes the decision-maker
being confronted with a problem that can be separated from other problems. The
13
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goals, values or objectives that guide the decision-maker are known and can be
clarified and ranked according to their importance. All various alternatives for
dealing with the- problem are 'examined: The -consequences that would follow
from selecting each alternative are investigated. Each alternative, and its
attendant consequences, is then compared with other alternatives. The decision-
maker will choose the alternative, and its consequences, that maximize
attainment of his or her goals, values, or objectives.
The incremental theory ofgecision-making is presented as a decision theory that
avoids many of the problems of the -rational-comprehensive theory and, at the
same time, is more descriptive of the way in which public officials actually make
decisions (Anderson, 1984: 137). Incrementalism includes the selection of goals
or objectives and the empirical analysis of the action needed to attain them are
closely intertwined with; rather' than distinct from, one another. The decision-
maker considers only some as opposed to all of the alternatives for dealing with
a problem, which will differ only incrementally (ie.marginally from existing
policies). For each alternative, only a limited number of "important"
consequences are evaluated. The problem confronting the decision-maker is
continually redefined. Incrementalism allows for countless ends-means and
means-ends adjustment that help make the problem more manageable. There is
no single decision or "right" solution for a problem. The testof a good decision is
that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on it, without agreeing that
the decision is the most appropriate or optimum means to an agreed objective
(ibid). Incremental decision-making is essentially remedial and is geared more
too ameliorating present, concrete s9cial imperfections than to promoting future
social goals.
Lindblom (cited in Anderson, 1984: 138) states that incrementalism is politically
expedient because it is easier to reach agreement when the matters in dispute
among various groups are only limited modifications of existing programs rather
14
than policy issues of great magnitude of an "all or nothing" character.
Incrementalism is also realistic because it recognizes that decision-makers lack
the time, expertise, and other resources needed to engage in comprehensive
analysis of all alternative solutions to existing problems. It accepts the fact that in
large, complex organizations there will inevitably be conflicts and disagreements
over policy.
Anderson (1989: 139) continues to state that the result is a rational decision- that
is, one that most effective,ly achieves a given end. Jt optimizes the best possible
decision. Lindblom (cited in Anderson, 1984: 13) argues that decision-makers are
not faced with concrete, clearly defined problems. He states that they first have
to identify and formulate the problems, in short, often a major problem for the
decision maker. In addition Anderson (1984: 142) states that decision-makers
can be influenced by personal, professional and organization considerations.
Decision-makers may well act according to their perceptions of the public interest
or their beliefs about what is pfoper, ne~ssary, or morally correct public policy.
He continues to argue that decision-making is an intellectual activity that involves
making a rational choice between alternatives, and the following types. of
decision can be identified. Impulsive decision-making, which occurs on the spur
of the moment with little discretion; value judgment or other alternatives being
taken into account. Intuitive decision':'making, involves a high degree of rationality
or clarity of thought being implied. The decision is not reached on the basis of
facts, neither are its results. determinable by means of facts and statistics. The
decision-maker "has a hunch" that this or that alternatives will have the desired
result. Single-choice decisions, means. that the decision maker has only two
choices: either accept the alternative or reject it (ibid).
Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 156) present us with the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up'
approach of decision-making. The 'top down' approach starts with the decisions
of the government, to which administrators carry out or fail to carry out decisions,
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and seeks to find reasons underlying the extent of the implementation. The most
serious shortcoming of this approach, however, concerns its focus on top-level
official decision-makers,; who often play a marginal role in implementation
compared to lower level officials and members of the public. Criticism of the 'top-
down' approach's neglect of a focus on lower level officials led to the
development of a 'bottom-up' approach. This approach directs attention to the
formal and informal relationships constituting the policy networks involved in
making and implementing policies (ibid).
Pfeffer (1993: 19) argues that there are three important things to remember
about decisions. First, a decision by itself changes nothing. Second, at the
moment a decision is made, we cannot possibly know whether it is good or bad.
The third and perhaps most important observation is that we almost invariably
spend more time living with th~ ~nsequence of our decisions than we do in
making them. In conclusion Brynard (cited in CI~te and Wissink, 2000: 153)
states that decision-making means choosing a preferred action from two or more
alternatives. This stage is closely linked to the implementation stage, whereby a
decision needs to be implemented before its consequences become clear. The
next important stage is that of the policy implementation.
1.6 Implementation
Pressman and Wildavsky argue that· (1973: 6) policy implementation is
characterized and governed by a wide· range of participants and perspectives.
Whilst there may be broad agreement in terms of a particular policy, the different
participants and perspectives create opportunity for blockage and delay in terms
of policy implementation. Then implementation is the ability to forge subsequent
links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results. In addition Van Meter
and Van Horm (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 166) state that policy
implementation encompasses those actions by public or private individuals (or
groups) that are directed or delegated the responsibility for the achievement of
16
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objectives set forth in prior policy decisions. In order to successfully implement
any program emanating from policy one needs to pay particular attention to the
complexities and role-players involved.
The argument by Turner and Hulme (1997: 77) are especially significant in this
instance. They note that the 'implementation phase may be seen as an arena in
which those responsible for allocating resources are engaged in political
relationships among themselves and with other actors intent on influencing that
allocation.' Added to this, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) stress that there
should be no distinction from policy design and implementation. In essence one
may argue that design and implementation of policy are not mutually exclusive. It
is important to be aware of·this because implementers are ultimately responsible
. "
not only for the initial conditions but also the goals, which they are expected to
reach. A more general definition of implementation by Pressman and Wildavsky
(1973: xv) 'is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to
obtain the desired results.' Implementation of a policy is not always easy or this
straightforward. Many factors come into play to show that implementation has its
own set of complications.
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 82) see as the first element of the
implementation framework a need for concentration on the initiation of the policy .
The critical issue here is that in order to ensure that implementation is achieved,
it is important to ensure that the technical detail of the policy is worked out. This
technical detail is viewed as critical to the level of success that will be attained in
respect of implementation. Technical detail relates to the actors, roles,
coordination, consensus, responsibilities, outcomes and timeframes, which at the
end of the day are critical to the success or failure of the implementation of
policy. This issue is directly linked to the second aspect of the implementation
framework that of policy formulation. Policy has to be flexible in order to interface
with challenges that may emerge in the implementation process. Pressman and
17
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Wildavsky (1973: 84) argue that at the point of implementation the details of a
policy begin to emerge and in this process environmental factors, actors, goals
and circumstances change."·.;· ..
The views suggested thus far have been those of authors from the developed
countries. In terms of the view from developing countries, Cloete and Wissink
(2000: 175) note that '... the .broad clusters of factor that impact on
implementation of social policy are likely to be similar. .. 'However they do suggest
cautionary points on viewing policy implementation from a developing country
perspective. 'Firstly, the broadly .defined literature on implementation in
developing countries is based even more on case studies than that in
industrialized countries. Second, it borrows much more from the literature on
implementation in industrialized countries than vice versa... is more firmly rooted
in the bottom-up tradition of implementation. Finally, and most importantly, even
where the broad factors identified as being important are similar, implementation
problems encountered in developing countries are hypothesized to be greater by
virtue of the political and social context in which implementation occurs' (2000:
175). As such, Turner and Hulme (2000: 75) succinctly argue that
'implementation is frequently a highly political process.' In terms of policy
implementation an argument by Preffer (1993: 20) is that the 'willingness to build
and wield power is a prerequisite for success in policy implementation'. He
continues to argue that although hierarchal authority is legitimate, there are three
associated problems that he highlights. Firstly, due to era of decentralization,
hierarchical is being questioned (ibid). Further, the personality of the person at
the apex could result in problems if their personality is questionable. Finally, the
way of getting things done is through establishing a strongly shared vision or
organizational culture.
A model of implementation that is suggested by Warwick (cited in Turner and
Hulme 2000: 176) and particularly applicable in developing countries is referred
18
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to as the 'transaction model of understanding policy implementation.' Warwick
. ' .. ' '..
suggests that the process of implementation is essentially a transaction. 'The
, .., , : . .".
concept of transaction implies deliberate action to achieve a result... , (ibid).This
model is premised on seven assumptions and include, policy is important in
establishing the parameters and directions of action, but it never determines the
exact course of implementation, formal organization structures are significant but
not deterministic, the programme's environment is a critical locus for transactions
affecting implementation, the process of policy formulation and programme
design can be as imp9rtantas" th~ :prodi,Jct, if!lplementer discretion is universal
and inevitable, clients greatly influence the" outcomes 6fimplementation and
implementation is inherently dynamic(Turner and Hulme 2000: 176). This stage
is closely linked to policy evaluation.
1. 7 Evaluation
Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 169) define policy evaluation as consisting of
assessing whether a public policy is achieving its stated objective and, if not,
what could be done to eliminate the hurdles in the way. In addition Cloete (2000:
212) states that policy evaluation or assessment is normally undertaken for one
or more of the following reasons: To measure progress towards the achievement
of policy objectives. To learn lessons from the project/programme for future
policy review, redesign or implementation strategies. To test the feasibility of an
assumption, principle, model, theory, proposal or strategy. To advocate a cause
better (ibid).
Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 215) present us with different types of evaluation,
formative, performance and summative evaluation. A formative evaluation is
frequently required at a very early in the policy planning process to undertake a
formal assessment (or appraise) the feasibility of the different policy options that
one can choose from. Evaluation carried out in the early stages of the
implementation process as formative, because they give direction and shape to
implementation. Performance evaluation is an ongoining process, while a policy
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project or programme is being implemented; a need exists to monitor the
implementation process in order to keep track of the time frame, the progress
towards objectives and the quality and quantity of outputs. This type of evaluation
focuses primarily on the effectiveness, efficiency and levels of public participation
in the implementation process. A summative evaluation is required, after the
completion of the policy project. Evaluations are done to assess either the
progress being made towards achieving policy objectives if those objectives can
be determined, or to assess the general results of the policy. These results
include any positive or negative changes to the status quo before the policy was
implemented, if any. After changes have been identified, it is important to
determine what caused those changes because they may not necessarily have
been caused by the policy (ibid). Cloete (2000: 223) states that potential or real
policy impact assessment is an important objective of evaluations. The main
objective of policy impact assessments. is to determine and measure significant
changes in policy target areas, groups o~ sectors over time as a result of policy
~. . -"
implementation. In other words, to determine the effect of something on
something else or, in policy terms, the effect a policy will have or has had on the
status quo, or the difference between intended and real outcomes where policy
intentions can be identified. Where policy objectives cannot be identified, the
assessment will have a more exploratory nature and will attempt to determine the
extent of the changes that took place over the specified time and exactly what
caused those changes and, why (ibid). Furthermore, Cloete (2000: 224) states
that the procedure used for impact assessments are the normal project
management processes designed to achieve clearly specified evaluation results
within a specified time period. He defines the first procedure, social impact
procedure 'as a significant improvement or deterioration in people's well-being or
a significant change in any aspect of community concern'. Social impacts are
intangible phenomena that cannot always be measured directly. Indicators need
to be used for this purpose (Cloete, 2000: 225). He defines the second
procedure, environmental imp~ct as~essment as being similar to social impact
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assessment, starting with a scooping exercise during which the issues,
alternatives and procedures to be followed are identified (ibid).
In addition, Cloete (2000: 225) defines an indicator as a measuring instrument
used to give a concrete, measurable but indirect value to an otherwise
unmeasurable, intangible concept. Indicators can be devised for different policy
sectors - social, environmental, cultural, economic, financial, etc. An indicator
therefore gives an approximate value or indication of what one is looking for. The
evaluation stage of the policycycle is extremely important. The reason for this is
that this stage will determine the success or failure of a policy. Many authors
have suggested that evaluation should take the form of continuous assessment
of a policy cycle. This should help the policy maker decide if at the outset it will
be feasible to continue to implement a policy.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter attempted to highlight the complexity involved in public policy
making and implementation.
Of particular relevance to the next sections of this research portfolio is the aspect
of policy making and implementation. As will be shown later, policy
implementation itself has its own set of complexities because it is at this stage of
the cycle that the goal and vision of the government policy is set into action.
Policy implementation requires amongst other criteria, co-ordination, consensus





This research project uses quaiitative research methodology. Qualitative
research involves working with descriptive data. This data is collected through
methods such as participant observation, in-depth interviewing and document
analysis. A historical research design was employed which allows for the
examination of secondary data sources. The instrument that will be used for data
collection is content analysis as it is used for analyzing the content of text.
In this part of my research project I :-viii begin by defining what is policy analysis
as this is a critical policy analysis. I will then identify the policy issues faced by
the National Department of Transport. This will be followed by a brief background
on the Department of Transport. I will then examine the Departments Policy
Framework followed by its response to its issues.
Dye (1992: xiii) states that policy analysis is concerned with "who gets what" in
politics and, more importantly, "why" and "what difference it makes." We are
concerned not only with what policies governments pursue but also why
governments pursue the policies they do, and what the consequences of these
policies are. In addition, Dye (1992: 4) states that public policy can be studied for
purely scientific reasons: understanding the causes and consequences of policy
decisions improves our knowledge of society.
Furthermore, public policy can also be studied for understanding the causes and
. consequences of public policy permits us to apply social science knOWledge to
the solution of practical problems..Public policy can also be studied to ensure
that the nation adopts the "right" policies to achieve the "right" goals (Ibid). He
continues to state that policy analysis encourages scholars and students to
attack critical policy issues with the tools of systematic inqUiry. There is an
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implied assumption in policy analysis that developing scientific knowledge about
the forces shaping public policy and the consequences of public policy is itself a
socially relevant activity, and that such analysis is a prerequisite to prescription,
advocacy, and activism (Dyer; 1992: 7).
It is questionable that policy analysis can ever provide "solutions" to problems.
First of all, it is easy to exaggerate the importance, both for good and for ill, of the
polices of governments. It is not clear that governments policies, however
ingenious, could cure all or even most of society's ills. Governments are
constrained by many powerful environmental forces-wealth, technology, patterns
of family life, class structure and so on. Secondly, policy analysis cannot offer"
solutions" to problems when there is no general agreement on what the problems
are. Thirdly, policy analysis deals with very subjective topics and must rely upon
interpretation of results (Dyer; 1992: 15).
2.2 Policy Issues
The main policy objective for the National Department of Transport is to reduce
the number of road accidents by encouraging and making more vehicle drivers
responsible and disciplined drivers. The National Department of Transport is
faced with many problems that stem from either whom cannot drive properly or
will not drive responsibly. Included in this is the high prevalence of speeding and
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. In addition, many vehicles are
unfit, or unroadworthy. Linked to this, is a high degree of fraud and corruption in
driver and vehicle licensing departments. There is also an unacceptable level of
pedestrian casualties. The introduction of new safety technologies like top speed
Iimiters and tyre safety devices have been developed to reduce the number of
road accidents. Government officials use indicators, such as statistics to prioritize
which problems will be dealt with first and given serious attention.
The main trafficoffences in South Africa are speed, drinking and driving (alcohol)
and vehicle and driver fitness. The core target remains the two major killers,
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speed and alcohol. However, the combination of these two factors takes its toll
over weekends, when the lethal speedl alcohol cocktails accounts for more than
60% of the weekly total crashes (wWw.transport.gov.za/projects/arrive/c1oser).
Speed on its own plays a contributory role in 75% of crashes on roads. According
to the Department of Transport (www.transport.gov.za/projects/arrive/closer) one
serious factor currently militating against comprehensive traffic law enforcement
is the fact that the traffic police officers normal working week runs from 8am to
5pm Monday to Friday, while statistics clearly show that 65% of road accidents
happen at night and over weekends.
2.3 Background ,
Since 1994 the Department of Transport has undergone transformation in
aspects that not only control road, freight, rail and air transport but also
development as in building and improving more roads and infrastructure. Further,
it has identified and designed different strategies to effect safer -transportation
and serve those least served by the previous government. The Department of
Transport has brought about development through constructing more than 6
500km of roads since 1994, and constructing roads in rural areas. This chapter
will focus on a brief outline of the Department of Transport and some of the policy
issues and challenges that they face. The second part will describe and analyze
the various strategies that the DOT has designed, and to some extent
implemented in its endeavor to curb the accident rates on our roads. This
analyses also attempts to show the various possible reasons behind the success
or failures of the implementation of these strategies.
2.4 Policy Framework
Transport infrastructure in South Africa is deeply affected by the disparities
arising from the imbalances of the past, with people, particularly the poor, and
those residing in rural areas often having to travel long distances. The South
24
Africa YearBook(2003-2004), claims that "this reduces the economic efficiency of
the transport system and has a high social cost because transport consumes a
relatively large proportion of the disposable income of the poor. Coupled with this
is the high rate of transport accidents, on both roads and rail".
Overcoming these problems is the central challenge facing the Department of
Transport. Transport policy is built on the framework set out by the Moving South
Africa project, which began in 1997, and the National Land Transition Act, 2000
(Act 22 of 2000).
The transport portfolio is overseen by the National Department of
Transport(DoT). DoT is responsible for addressing policy issues around
transport. It is also responsible for providing a policy framework on issues
regarding transport in South Africa. The Provincial Department of Transport is
delegated to address the various transport policy issues, which affect their
provinces only.
The National government is responsible for policy formulation and policy-making,
developing national standards and norms, rules and regulations. Chapter 3 of the
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) declares that the three spheres of government
must be distinctive (meaning that each sphere has its own unique area of
operation), interdependent (meaning that the three spheres are required to co-
operate and acknowledge each other's area of jurisdiction) and interrelated
(meaning that there should be a system of co-operative governance and
intergovernmental relations among the three spheres). This emphasizes the
need for co-operative government across the different spheres of government.
Thus, theoretically, each sphere must work together for a common good. This
type of governance is aimed at avoiding duplication and establishing proper co-
ordination between the various spheres of government. The characteristic of the
distribution of state authority and autonomy encompasses the devolution of
power and authority to pass legislation that are best suited to their sphere. This
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must obviously be in accordance with the Constitution. In this regard the
constituents have an obligation to join together and mobilize for policy issues that
concern or irtlp~ct on, th~m\,pir~IY.'1h~ . government must also strike up
. ..' '. "; . '" .
partnerships with either private or civic organizations to ensure that issues and
problems are timeously attended to. Chapter 3 of the Constitution further says
that the relationship between the spheres of government is determined in
accordance with the principle of co-operative governance and inter-governmental
relations.
. .
The idea behind the sepa~ation· of powers is to further decentralization. The
separation and -'delegation of power to other spheres of government is a
mechanism used to deepen and strengthen democracy. It is argued that the way
a government ~ecutes its duties can be better monitored with the separation of
power between the legislatures, executive and judiciary.
2.5 The White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996)
In terms of the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 4) the broad goal
of transport is the smooth and.· efficient interaction that allows society and the
economy to assume their preferred form. According to the White Paper on
National Transport Policy (1996: 16) the mission statement of the National
Department of Transport is "to ensure an acceptable level of quality in road
traffic; with the emphasis on road safety, on the South African urban and rural
road network". The vision for South African transport is of a system which will
'provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient, and fully integrated transport operations
and infrastructure. This system must meet the needs of freight and passenger
customers. In addition it should irriprove -levels of service and cost in a fashion
which supports government strategies'. for economic and social development
whilst being ,environmentally and economically sustainable' (ibid).The White
Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 5) states that in order to progress





• To support the goals ~{theRecoristruetion and Development Programme
for meeting basic needs,'~r6~ing' th~:'~6~n6my, developing human
. ': : . ".' '., '..
resources, and democratizing decision making.
• To enable customers requiring transport for people or goods to access
the transport system in ways, which best satisfy their chosen criteria.
• To improve the safety, security, reliability, quality, and speed of
transporting goods and people.
• To imp'rove ~9~tfi,~,Atrica,,$~.i~p~peti~iyeness, and that of its transport
infrastructure and' ope~~iion~'~h~~U9h g:~~te'r"eff~ctiv~ness and efficiency
to better meet the needs of different customer groups, both locally and
globally.
• To invest in infrastructure or transport systems in ways which satisfy
social, economic, or strategic investment criteria. To achieve the above
objectives in a manner, which is economically and .e!1vironmentally
sustainable, and minilllizes negative side effects.
. . .' ~ .
Transport plays a sig~ificant role in the soci;:!1 and economic development of
any country, and the Government has recognized transport as one of its five
main priority areas for socio-economic development. The effectiveness of the
role played by transport is to a large extent dictated by the, soundness of
transport policy and the strategies utilized in implementing the policy.
According to the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 45), road
traffic and, s~fety as a fQ~u~ ar,~a of transport policy is concerned with the
~ : . ':' ... . ,
quality of road vehicles (inclUding motorized and non-motorised vehicles); -'_
. . '. '.- .. '.
drivers of vehicles; operators of vehicles; pedestrians; road traffic operations;
the road environment; and interaction in the traffic network (inclUding the
mutual interaction between road users and the interaction between road
users, the road infrastructure, and the road environment).
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The concept "road traffic quality" encompasses traffic safety; traffic discipline;
the protection of the road infrastructure and the environment; administrative
order in road traffic; and economic order in roadtraffic. The "functional areas
of road traffic management" are: road traffic control (law enforcement);
adjudication of traffic offences; enhancement of road user knowledge, skills
and attitudes, incident management; road traffic engineering (including
transport and traffic engineering, traffic operations management, and road
vehicle engineering); and support functions (including traffic legislation,
information management( 'jcens,ing;c~mdregistratiori,and road traffic related
research and development) (ibid). The mission to be fulfilled by institutions
and persons involved in road traffic is "To ensure an acceptable level of
quality in road traffic, with the emphasis on road safety, on the South African
urban and rural road network". The strategic objective in road traffic is to
promote and implement ~fficient, integrated, and co-ordinated road traffic
management sy!?t~ms. in.'_ ~hecouf1try,involving the role players in all
functional areas of road traffic management. The aim is:
• To improve road traffic safety
• To enhance road traffic discipline
• To protect the expensive capital investment in the road system
• To enhance administrative and economic order in the field of road
traffic transport.
According to the .White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 49) a solution
. ., \
of road traffic problems' can only be reached if the need to focus on the human
aspects of road traffic is fully recognized. The improvement of road user
knowledge, skills and attitudes as a road traffic management function is targeted -,-
as a priority, due to the inadequate emphasis of this function in the past, and in
view of the extreme importance of this function in achieving acceptable levels of
road traffic quality. In addition, all categories of road users will continuously be
exposed to a purposeful programme targeted at enhancing their knowledge,
skills and attitudes, at promoting their voluntary compliance with the law, and at
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developing community ownership and participation in enhancing road traffic
quality (ibid).
Road user knowledge, skills and attitudes will be enhanced by a comprehensive
approach, including formal education within a formal educational setting, non-
formal education in non-educational organizations, and informal education where
media such as radio television, posters, pamphlets are used. Traffic control (law
enforcement) programmes will be supported by well researched promotional and
motivational programmes, so as .to create the necessary public understanding of
their responsibilities, public understanding of the reasons for the existence of the
law, and public acceptance and support for their control activities; to increase
public awareness of the control programmes; and to enhance the effectiveness
of the programmes (White Paper on ;National Transport Policy; 1996: 48).
". .' \ .' .. .
Table 1 below indicates .that since 2001 there has been an increase in the
--
number of road accidents in KwaZulu-Natal. The contributory factors have been
identified as undisciplined drivers, speeding, drinking and disregard of the law.
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(Source: National Department of Transport intranet)
According to the Department of Transport, there are currently 512 000 traffic
crashes a year on the South African roads. Of these, about 28 000 are fatal or
lead to serious i~jury. In addi~ion, there are 7 260 crashes involving fatalities, 21
265 involving serious injuries. The total cost of crashes to the South African
economy is currently estimated at around R13.8 billion a year. One of the
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contributory factors identified by the Department of Transport in road accidents is
the number of unlicensed drivers and unlicensed vehicles. This is depicted in the
Table 2 below: . ~....~;. ~.:. " .




(Source: KwaZulu-Natal Department of Transport intranet)
Table 3.1 details the number of offences experienced in KwaZulu-Natal during
the festive season in 2003. This is radically higher than the statistics on the
. ".. ~ .."
Limpopo Provinces in table 3.2.· By comparing the two provinces, KwaZulu-Natal
ia a province with the highest traffic provinces. It ap·pears that drivers in KwaZulu-
Natal have a greater tendency to drink and drive, to speed, not to carry licences
or to drive without licences. One can note that the contrib~t~ry factors to
KwaZulu-Natars high road death accidents are drivers with complete disregard
of the law or lack of reinforcement by the traffic department in this province.
During the festive season many people travel by car to their holiday destinations
in South Africa, when there ~ ,usLt8,lIy a high road death accidents nation-wide.
KwaZulu-Natal is one of the most visited province·s in the country during the
festive season.
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(Source: KwaZulu-Natal Department of Transport intranet)
Table :3.2 Festive Season Statistics: Limpopo Province 2003
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2.6 Programmes and Strategies of the DoT
Apartheid policies with regard to transport promoted discrimination and
segregation. The Department of Transport reformulated and its policies to make
them more inclusive. :., ..
Early in 1995 the Department··of Tradspo'rf(DoT>, em'barked 'on a project to
review and revisit transport policy and formulate new policy where it has become
necessary to adjust to a changed environment. This policy making process
involved, as far as possible, all role players and the public at large in identifying
issues, generating policy options and discussing and accepting policy proposals.
A working group involving a cross section of role players in the transport industry .
was established, to develop',c:ln overarc~ing framework for national transport
policy. It formulated a long-term vision for transportiri South Africa.
Following the first plenary meeting in 1995 and the various public seminars, the
working groups, taking cognizance of the input received and the issues and
problems identified, produced revised reports with policy proposals to address
the issues such as fraud, speeding, drinking and driving unfit vehicles, non
payment of traffic fines, rec~less driVing, increasing rate of road accidents, and
driving without seatbelts. Their. contents were summarized into a draft Green
Paper on National Transport Policy,' which w?s then released to the public in
March 1996. During April, May, and June of 1996, a large number of comments
were received from interested parties across the entire transport sector. These
were reviewed at a work session in May, and a draft white paper was drafted.
The Draft White Paper on National Transport Policy was circulated to key
stakeholders in July 1996, to allow for final comment, and as a basis for further
bilateral discussi9ns. The policies ~xpressed in the' White Paper on National
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Transport Policy are thus the result of a broad public policy making process
(ibid).
In a response to address the policy issues and goals stipulated in the white paper
the National Department of Transport drew up a variety of programmes and
strategies. The major one being the Department of Transport's Strategic Plan for
2003 a three-year strategic plan to make implementation of road safety strategies
more effective. Further, it is geared towards ensuring that South African transport
policy is managed in an efficient and effective manner.
The Strategic Plan aims at:
• Ensuring an institutional environment that promotes a safe, efficient and
internationally competitive aviation and maritime industry, promoting and
developi~g an intern~~ional a~r transport serving South Africa.
• Enabling, coordinating, and promoting ,quality and safety in road traffic
: . " ..'.
through an all-encompassing, road traffic, manageJT!,ent strategy,
. .. '
developing and maintaining road traffic policy, legislation and information
systems and controlling the issuing of driving licenses.
• Undertaking and promoting communication and education in respect of
road traffic quality and safety, providing for cooperative and coordinated
strategic planning, regulation, facilitation and law enforcement in respect
of road traffic, and maint~ifling and developing South Africa's national
. . (,~ . : -..$
road netw~rk. '. ' " . .
• Developing, monitoring and evaluating transport policy in South Africa,
and developing and maintaining data and information systems for the
development of transport strategy. "-
2. 7 The Strategic Plan
2.7.1 The'Roadto Safety Strategy
The Road to Safety Strategy is part of the National Department of Transport's
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Strategic Plan. It is a strategic initiative, which refines and streamlines the
priorities outlined in the National Department of Transport Strategic Plan
2002/2003.The Road to Safety Strategy is driven bythe need to find answers to
a set of clearly identified interlocking problems across the whole spectrum of
road safety and traffic management. The problems identified are:
• Road Environment Quality
• Vehicle Fitness
• Pedestrian Safety and Fitness (safe road usage by pedestrians)
• Reform of Regulatory and Monitoring Institutions.
• Targeted communication campaigns to challenge public attitudes and
behaviour, supported by private sector sponsorship; practical road safety
training in schools and tertiary:ihstitutions, community road safety for and
programmes.
The interventions it proposed by The Road to Safety Strategy are derived from
an in-depth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in each of the three critical
areas of road safety: the road environment; the road user; and the vehicle. The
strategy requires that systematic attention be paid to upgrading road
infrastructure and signage on the basis of continuous audits of hazardous
. . :.' \
locations and crash red spots'. rt requires that drivers are fit to drive and vehicles
fit to use our roads. The Road to Safety targets incompetence, fraud and
corruption (Road to Safety: 2001-2005).
2.7.2 Strategic Framework
The National Department of Transport has embarked on a number programs to
deal with fraudulent driving licences. One such programe entails the conversion
of drivers' licence into a credit card format. This strategy was first introduced in
March 1998 to try and end the i~sueing of fraudulent drivers' licences. The credit
card format driving-licence is vaild for five years, meaning that drivers have to
renew their licence cards every 5 years. The conversion process was scheduled
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over a five year period. The Department of Transport extended the deadline for
the conversion of the old bopk-style driving licence to the credit card format to 2B
February 2003.:Thecredit;·ca:tqI6~at. ;drivingliQ~n~ is valid for five years.
Motorists who failed to convert during this time could either be fined or have their
current driving licences nullified. Furthermore, the credit card format driving
licence is tamper proof with various security features, which make fraud
impossible and thus improving the overall road safety. Future plans include the
possibility to scan the card and link the driver to other vehicles and outstanding
offences. A further aim is.to lin~ the new credit card driving licence system with
the Points Demerit System,' where~y points will be administered through the. . .
scanning of the new credit card driving licences. (The Points Demerit System will
be discussed later on).
2.7.3 The Arrive Alive Campaign
Over the past years the National Department of Transport- has actively
implemented the Arrive Alive campaigns to reduce the number of road accidents.
The Arrive Alive road safety campaign was initiated as a short-term initiative
. .
aimed at reducing the numbefof road accidents on South Africa's roads. Every
year, about 10 000 people are killed and 150 000 injured in approximately 500
000 accidents. The cost of road traffic accidents is estimated at more than R13
billion a year (South Africa YearBook: 2003-2004). The success of this
campaign has been difficult to establish. The campaign is primarily aimed at
changing driver behaviour and attitude rather than enforcing law.
The campaign was initiated in Octo.ber 1997 and is still an on-going campaign
conducted in phases. Initial progress towards the implementation of a Business
Plan was slow, mainly due to an initial lack of funds and resources. Road deaths
over the Christmas 1996 and Easter 1997 periods continued to show an alarming
growth rate. Arrive Alive was implemented over a 4 month period, from October
1997 to January,199B. It operated at its highest level of intensity in the provinces
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of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. Again, the campaign was
aimed at addressing the main types of potentially lethal traffic offences identified
from historic information. These were alcohol, speed, overtaking, overloading,
driving unlicensed or with fraudently obtained licences and un-roadworthiness of
vehicles. Arrive Alive chose to focus on the three major causes of deaths and
organized its implementation around these; namely in October, it targeted
alcohol; November it targeted speed; and in December and January it targeted
alcohol, speed and failure to wear seatbelts. The total budget for Arrive Alive was
R50 million. An amount of R37 million was made available by the Road Accident
Fund (RAF); R2 million by Glenrand MIB, while the rest, an amount of R11
million was provided by the National Department of Transport
(www.transport.gov.zalprojects/arrive/interim.html).
The main objectives of The Arrive Alive Campaign was to reduce the number of
road traffic accidents in general, and fatalities in particular, by 5% annually; and
improve road user compliance with traffic laws; forge an improved working
relationship between traffic authorities in the various spheres of government. The
Arrive Alive campaign is only implemented during the Easter and December
holidays. Some feel that the inconsistency of the Arrive Alive campaign has
contributed to its unsuccessfulness, and it is argued that the Arrive Alive
Campaign should become permanent, with continous emphasis on law-
enforcement. However, how feasible this maybe is difficult to determine as it is
an expensive and labour-intensive campaign to implement.
2.7.4 The Points Demerit System
In addition to the Arrive Alive Campaign, the National Department of Transport
introduced a Bill in 1998, The Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic
Offences Bill. This Bill was aimed at discouraging the non-payment of penalties
by imposing additional costs on persons who failed to pay their fines. Part of the
Points Demerit System was to settle majority traffic offences outside courts and
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to introduce a points demerit system in terms of which illegal behaviour is
penalized by the imposition of points which may ultimately lead to the suspension
or cancellation of a driving licence.
In addition the AARTO Bill of 1998 states that the Point Demerit System (PDS) is
a strategy by the government which aims to: reduce the road accident rate;
increase awareness among road drivers about safety on the road; to create road
drivers who are disciplined and responsible on the road and; to take action
against drivers who break the laws of the road.
The Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Bill (AARTO) contains a
countrywide fixed penalty system for certain offences. For example, disobeying a
stop sign will no longer vary from R200.00 to R100.00 depending on the
magisterial district in which the offence is committed. In terms of the major
proposal made in the AARTO Bill, the vast majority of road traffic offences will no
longer be treated as crimes for which offenders are prosecuted in the criminal
courts.
However, serious offences such as drinking-and-driving, excessive speeding,
reckless driving and hit-and-run cases will remain crimes and the offenders will
still have to appear in criminal courts. The Bill introduces an additional procedure
whereby offenders will be tracked through the countrywide National Traffic
Information System (NaTIS), a system to ensure that fines are paid. The Bill
introduces a number of disincentives like the suspension of a drivers licence to
persons who fail to pay their fines in order to gain compliance to the Department
of Transport's various policies.
The AARTO Bill of 1998 provides for a system whereby a person or operator is
punished twice for an offence. Firstly, the offender receives a penalty; additional
to that he or she also receives a number of demerit points. In event that the
demerit points exceeds the maximum points (12 points) a person's driving
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licence or operator card will be suspended for a period of time (3 months for
every point). The driver's licence card will be taken away for the suspension of
the licence will be cancelled. If a driver successfully appeals against a conviction
by the court for an offence no demerit points are recorded unless the appeal is
rejected or abandoned, but nothing prevents a person from approaching the
court on appeal or review in connection with the demerit points recorded against
that person in the said register.
Table:4 How You Score
Offence Penalty Amount ··Demerit
Units Points
Motor vehicle not 10 R500.00 2
registered




No Seatbelt 5 R250.00 1
Not stopping at a stop 15 R750.00 3
sign
Overloading by 25% 25 R1250.0 3
0




Up to 20% over the speed R250.00 No demerit
Limit e.g. 60kph limit Points




31-45% over the speed R750.00 2
limit
46-60% over the speed R1250.00 3
limit
60% and over No fine- 4
Court
(Source: Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Bill; 1998 )
2.8 Conclusion
In conclusion, it is important to note that the National Department of Transport is
faced with numerous issues, such as reckless driving, speeding, alcohol, non-
payment of fines, disrespect for the law, fraudulent driving licences. Most
importantly the increasing number of road accidents on national roads.
In its effort to address the above issues, the National Department of Transport
created and designed a three year strategic plan. In this strategic plan, three
programmes were designed. First being the Arrive Alive Campaign, t~is
programme proofed successful at its initial stages on implementation. However,
considering that the number of vehicles on our roads have increased. It has been
difficult to implement this programme. This is due to the fact that there" is a
" shortage of staff, resources to implement the programme throughout the year as
it is only implemented during Christmas and Easter holidays. Another pitfall of
this programme is that most traffic offences and accidents occur over the
weekends, and in the night. One needs to note that most traffic officials do not
work over weekends and during the night. Another problem is that the Arrive
Alive Campaign is more concerned with changing drivers behaviour than law
enforcement.
An imperative point is that the National Department of Transport does not
evaluate and m~nitor the effectiveness of its programmes. The Department of
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Transport has proved to be inaccurate in terms of gathering statistics on road
traffic offences and number of road accidents. One would align this to the fact
that the Department of Transport does not monitor its programmes and does not
have well capacitated staff.
The Points Demerit System is one of those programmes that would have proved
to be successful if only it would be implemented. It is a good programme
theoretically, but the Department of Transport have failed to be pragmatic. This
programme is more concerned with law enforcement th~t changing behaviour.
This however, could be that the DoT does not have the resources to obtain the
technology to implement this programme, or it does not have well capacitated




This is the last component of my research portfolio and it is a review of the
theoretical perspective discussed in the first part in light of the Department of
Transport's transport policy. This report will focus on the implementation part of
the policy-making process of transport policies, since the study was aimed at
identifying why some policies are implemented successfully and others are not.
As it will be shown later, policy implementation itself has its own set of
complexities because it is at the stage of the cycle that the goal and vision of the
government policy is set into action. Policy implementation requires amongst
other criteria, co-ordination, consensus and most importantly attention to the
variety of actors that impact on the implementation of policy.
Noting from the policy analysis of the Department of Transport's programmes it is
clear that the various stages in the policy cycle were never properly integrated.
The Department of Transport was able to identify it's policy issues as being
speeding, drinking and driving, reckless driving and fraudulent drivers licence. In
response to these issues the Department of Transport was able to make a
decision to find the best solutions to deal with such issues (e.g. Arrive Alive
Campaign; Points Demerit System and Road to Safety Strategy). However, th~
technical detail of implementation and evaluation and monitoring were not taken
into careful consideration. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 82) argue that the
critical issue is that in order to ensure that implementation is achieved, it is
important to ensure that the technical detail of the policy is worked out. This
technical detail is viewed as critical to the level of success that will be attained in
respect of implementation.
It is clear from the analysis of the DoTs programmes that the Department of
Transport have not placed effective measures in the way their programmes are
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to be implemented, coordinated and monitored. For example, the Points Demerit
System was supposed to be implemented 5 years ago. This programme has not
been implemented. Another example is that the Arrive Alive Campaign produces
statistics on the number of road accidents on the national roads, but does not
inform the public on how and why road accidents happen as way to create more
responsible road users. It is also clear that this programme is not well
coordinated in a sense that the Arrive Alive Campaign is implemented during the
holidays and not throughout the year. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 82) argue
that technical detail relates to the actors, roles, coordination, consensus,
responsibilities, outcomes and timeframes which at the end of the day are critical
to the success or failure of the implementation of policy.
It is also clear that the Department of Transport lacks the staff, resources,
capacity and technology to effectively and efficiently implement its programmes.
Pressman and Wildavsky( 1973: 84) argue that policy has to be flexible in order
to interface with challenges that may emerge in the implementation process. At
the point of implementation the details of a policy begin to emerge and in this
process environmental factors, actors, goals and circumstances change. ·In
addition, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xv) continue to argue that goals have
to be clearly defined and understood, resources made available, the chain of
command be capable of assembling and controlling resources, and the system
able to communicate effectively and control those individuals and organizations
involved in the performance of tasks (ibid).
It is clear form the Points Demerit System that the Department of Transport was
ambitious in the adoption of this policy. Too much was expected from this policy
in a way that it was supposed to be linked to the new credit card driving licence.
However, when the Department of Transport encountered issues of technology,
resources, and well capacitated staff resulted in the delay in the implementation
of this policy , eventually resulting in the policy failing before it could be
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implemented. This concurs with Birkland (1984: 189) who provides the following
explanations as to why policy implementation fails:
• Failure needs to be assessed in terms of the "do nothing" option and in
terms of the likelihood that other options would have been more or less
successful.
• Changing circumstances can render policies less successful.
• Policies are interrelated, and these relationships must be taken into
account.
• Political boundaries (between states, for example) will influence policy
success.
• We may expect too much from policies.
• Policies sometimes fail when they go beyond what we know we can
achieve now. But ambitious policy making can be the result of "speculative
argumentation" that seeks to induce innovation. The stated purpose of a
policy may not be the actual purpose; there may be more s.ymbolic goals
than substance.
• Policy will fail if it is not based on sound casual theory.
• The choice of ineffective tools will likely yield failure. But the choice 'of .
tools is often a function of compromise or ideological predisposition.
• The problems inherent in policy implementation can contribute to policy
failure.
• "Policy failure is simply a symptom of more profound ailments within· our
political institutions".
In terms of my policy analysis of the Department of Transport's programmes, it
is clear that the Department of Transport has failed to engage itself in the
evaluation and monitoring of its programs. For example, the DoT has over the
past years initiated the Arrive Alive Campaign to reduce the number of road
accidents. DoT has been more interested in reducing the statistics and failed to
identify the reasons why the number of road accidents continue to be rife. In.
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addition, Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 169) argue that evaluations are done to
assess either the progress being made towards achieving policy objectives if
those objectives can be determined, or to assess the general results of the
policy. These results include any positive or negative changes to the status quo
before the policy was implemented, if any. In addition, Dye(1992: 358) argues
that most government agencies make some effort to review the effectiveness of
their own programs. These reviews usually take one or another of the following
forms:
• Hearings and Reports.
This is the most common type of program review. Government
administrators are asked by chief executives or legislators to give
testimony (formally or informally) regarding the accomplishments of their
own programs.
• Site Visits.
Occasionally teams of high-ranking administrators, or expert consultants,
or legislators, or some combination of these people, will decide to visit
agencies or conduct inspections in the field. These teams can pick up
impressionistic data about how programs are being run, whether programs
are following specific guidelines, whether they have competent staff.
• Program Measures.
The data developed by government agencies themselves generally cover
policy output measures.
• Comparison with Professional Standards.
In· some areas of government activity, professional associations have
developed standards of excellence.
• Evaluation of Citizen Complaints.
This is an analysis of citizen complaints. Occasionally, administrators
develop questionnaires to give to participants in their program in order to
learn what their complaints may be and whether they are satisfied or not.
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In conclusion it is clear that the Department of Transport has not engaged itself in
the reviewing of its programmes. This policy analysis of the Department of
Transport's policies and programmes concludes that one cannot assess whether
or not the Department of Transport's policies or programmes are successfully
implemented because they have not considered or designed measures of
evaluation or impact of any of their policies.
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